Police Liability for Negligent Investigations: When Will a Duty of Care Arise? by Shircore, Mandy
 
POLICE LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT 
INVESTIGATIONS: WHEN WILL A DUTY OF 
CARE ARISE? 
 
MANDY SHIRCORE! 
 
[In 1988 in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, the House 
of Lords denied a duty of care was owed by police to a victim of a 
serial murderer. The case was interpreted as immunity from 
negligence actions for police when involved in the suppression 
and investigation of crime’. Recent cases in Australia and the 
United Kingdom have confirmed that while blanket immunity 
from negligence actions for police involved in investigatory 
functions does not exist, plaintiffs alleging negligence will face 
considerable difficulties establishing a duty of care was owed. 
The recent cases provide an opportunity to re-examine the 
appropriate tests to apply in determining the existence and scope 
of police duty of care and to reassess the policy grounds 
underlying the decisions. In doing so the article argues that 
Australian courts should avoid the UK approach of applying a 
broad exclusionary rule particular to police, as sufficient 
safeguards already exist in the Australian High Court’s duty of 
care formulation for public authorities.] 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
There is no doubt that police officers owe a duty to protect the public.1 The 
translation of the duty to a private duty in the developing tort of negligence is 
however contentious. The first element necessary in conversion of the public 
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1 See generally Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 (‘Hill’), 241; 
Peat v Lin [2004] QSC 219, [10]; Police Services Administration Act 1990 (Qld) s 
10.5. 
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duty to a private duty in negligence is establishing that the defendant owes a 
duty of care to the plaintiff. Without a duty being owed, harm caused to the 
plaintiff by the defendant’s negligent conduct is without redress.2 
 
Ever since Lord Aitkin’s neighbourhood test was propounded in Donoghue v 
Stevenson,3 the courts have struggled with its application to harm caused to 
the plaintiff by the defendant’s omission to act. Foreseeability of injury is not 
enough, but defining exactly what is required has proved illusive. When 
coupled with the long held view that there is generally no common law duty 
to rescue another4 or protect another from harm inflicted by a third party,5 the 
issue of when and in what circumstances a police authority, who’s functions 
include rescue and protection, owe a duty of care in negligence is similarly 
unclear.  
 
In 1988, the House of Lords, citing lack of proximity and public policy 
grounds, denied a duty of care was owed by police to a victim of a serial 
murderer.6 The case was interpreted as immunity from negligence actions for 
police when involved in the ‘suppression and investigation of crime’.7 
Treatment of the Hill decision by subsequent courts in the United Kingdom 
came under criticism by the European Court of Human Rights.8 Despite this, 
recently the House of Lords confirmed that public policy grounds operate to 
deny a duty of care owed to victims of crime in relation to investigative 
functions of police.9 The Hill immunity, although not endorsed in its ‘full 
breadth’, was applied in Brooks10 to deny a right of action in negligence to a 
victim of ‘a litany of derelictions of duty and failure in police investigation.’11 
 
 
                                                 
2 Where police conduct amounts to intentional torts such as assault, battery or false 
imprisonment a cause of action will arise. This paper focuses purely on police liability 
for negligent conduct in situations where the intentional torts do not also arise. 
3 [1932] AC 562, 580. 
4 Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 (HL); For discussion of the general rule see Natalie 
Gray and James Edelman ‘Developing the law of omissions: a common law duty to 
rescue?’ (1998) 6 Torts Law Journal 18. 
5 Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254 (Modbury). 
6 Hill [1989] AC 53.  
7 See, eg, Osman v Ferguson [1993] 4 All ER 344 (‘Osman’); Hughes v National 
Union of Mineworkers [1991] 4 All ER 278 (‘Hughes’); Elguzouli-Daf v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1995] QB 335. 
8 Osman v. United Kingdom - 23452/94 [1998] ECHR 101 (28 October 1998). 
9 Brooks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 24 (‘Brooks’). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid [8]. 
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Other jurisdictions have not felt it necessary to embrace the notion of public 
policy immunity for police in the suppression and investigation of crime.12 In 
canvassing comparative law, Lord Bingham, in Brooks, acknowledged the 
opposing approaches in Canada and South Africa, and referred to the 
Australian High Court’s decision in Sullivan v Moody13 as being ‘generally’ 
consistent with the reasoning in Hill.14 The existence and scope of the duty 
owed by police in the investigation and suppression of crime has not been 
directly considered by the High Court of Australia, although support for the 
UK approach is evident in a number of judgments. Consistent with the 
difficulties in determining the existence of a duty of care in novel cases, state 
courts have struggled in a number of recent decisions with defining the scope 
of the duty of care owed by police.15  
 
As was noted in Brooks it can no longer be said that police enjoy 
unquestionable public confidence that they will apply ‘their best endeavours 
to the performance’ of their functions.16 Fear of terrorist attacks has led to 
unprecedented widening of police powers, deepening concerns among civil 
libertarians that human rights abuses against those under investigation may be 
sanctioned. Within this turbulent climate, the fine balancing act between 
police accountability and the requirement for police discretion and freedom of 
investigation becomes more acute. With these concerns in mind, this article 
seeks to explain the existence and scope of police liability in negligence in 
Australia.  
 
In part two the article defines what is meant by immunity in law. Part three 
traces the development of police liability in negligence in the United 
Kingdom, how it has been dealt with in other jurisdictions and recent  
 
 
                                                 
12 Doe v Metropolitan Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police (1998) 160 D.L.R. 
(4th) 697 (‘Doe’); Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse [2003] 3 SCR 263; Carmichele v 
Minister of Safety and Security (2001) 12 BHRC 60; Whithair v Attorney General 
(1996) 2 NZLR 45.  
13 (2001) 207 CLR 562. 
14 Brooks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 24 referring to 
Sullivan v Moody [2002] CLR 251, [57], [60].  
15 Quintano v New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 278; Wilson v State of New South 
Wales [2001] NSWSC 869, Peat v Lin & ors [2004] QSC 219; Cran v State of New 
South Wales [2004] NSWCA 92; Tahche v Abboud and Others [2002] VSC 36; 
Zalewski and Anor v Turcarolo [1995] 2 VR 562; Gibbs v Commissioner of Police 
and Queensland [2000] QCA 33; Batchelor v State of Tasmania (2005) Aust Torts 
Reports 81-782. 
16 Brooks [2005] UKHL 24, [28] (Lord Steyn). 
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treatment of the principles in Australian cases. Part four will discuss the 
policy considerations which have justified the imposition of a ‘no-duty’ or 
‘public policy immunity’ rule in the UK, a rule adopted at least in part by 
Australian courts. 
 
This analysis will demonstrate that there are two possible courses open to 
Australian courts in determining whether police owe a duty of care in 
particular circumstances. The first is to follow the UK approach, which adopts 
a broad ‘no-duty’ rule, to which few exceptions have been found; the second 
is to apply to police the general principles developed by the High Court of 
Australia applicable to the determination of duty of care owed by public 
authorities.17 This second approach treats the relevant policy arguments as one 
of a number of possible salient features to be measured in determining 
whether a duty of care is owed.18  
 
It will be argued that the United Kingdom approach has resulted in 
inconsistent and flawed attempts to justify exceptions to the immunity 
principle. Further it will be argued that some of the public policy grounds 
enunciated in Hill are outdated and require reconsideration. The paper 
concludes that there are sufficient principles19 that Australian courts have 
imposed on the duty of care owed by public authorities charged with 
investigative functions and the duty owed to protect a person from harm by 
third parties to adequately limit liability of police authorities. Care must be 
taken not to elevate policy considerations to the status of ‘immunity’, 
irrespective of qualification.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 See Graham Barclay Oysters Property Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540; Sullivan v 
Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562. 
18 Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1990) 200 CLR 1, [93] 
(McHugh J). 
19 These could equally be described as policies. Note Jane Stapleton’s argument in 
‘The golden thread at the heart of tort law: Protection of the vulnerable’ (2003) 24 
Australian Bar Review137 that distinguishing between principle and policy is 
artificial and the terminology should be ‘ditched’ in favour of a neutral description of 
‘legal concerns’.  
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II  WHAT IS MEANT BY IMMUNITY IN LAW?  
Put simply, immunity refers to an exemption from liability, or an exemption 
from the duties imposed by law, generally on grounds of public policy.20 The 
mechanism by which the exemption is granted in negligence is, at the first 
stage of the analysis, the duty of care.  
 
In discussing the utility of the duty concept as a means of containing liability 
in negligence, Jane Stapleton argues that ‘[i]t is a particularly efficient way of 
signalling countervailing systemic factors because it allows a coherent 
presentation of a no-liability outcome even in those cases where the conduct 
of the defendant was unreasonable and where, therefore, it is not possible to 
resort to “no-breach’ justification.’21 In situations where the relationship 
between the parties, will always give rise to the no-liability outcome, due to 
explicit countervailing factors, it may be argued that immunity from liability 
exists.  
 
A conclusion that immunity from liability exists in relation to a particular 
situation or relationship must however be carefully drawn. In Darker v Chief 
Constable of the West Midlands Police22 where the court was examining the 
scope of the witness ‘absolute immunity’ rule as applied to police evidence 
and investigatory work, Lord Clyde noted: 
 
It is temptingly easy to talk of the application of immunities 
from civil liability in general terms. But since the immunity 
may cut across the rights of others to a legal remedy and so 
runs counter to the policy that no wrong should be without a 
remedy, it should only be allowed with reluctance, and 
should not be readily extended.23 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 See for eg Darker v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2001] 1 AC 435; 
D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 214 ALR 92. 
21 Jane Stapleton, ‘Duty of Care: Peripheral parties and alternative opportunities for 
deterrence’, [1995] 111 The Law Quarterly Review 301, 303. Stapleton defines a 
‘countervailing factor’ as ‘one which the courts find persuasive in justifying the 
decision not to impose liability whenever it is present, even if the defendant in a 
particular case had clearly been careless and caused an actionable form of damage to 
the plaintiff.’ 
22 [2001] 1 AC 435 (‘Darker’). 
23 Ibid 456. 
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While it may prove difficult to mark the precise bounds of a particular 
situation giving rise to immunity from liability, thereby requiring some 
variance in application, ‘[o]nce a situation has been identified as deserving of 
immunity it may readily be accepted that the immunity is in its quality 
absolute’.24 
 
Recent confirmation in Australia of the advocate’s immunity for work done in 
court or ‘work intimately connected with’ work in court is an example of 
immunity from liability.25 Like other parties in the courtroom procedure,26 the 
advocate’s immunity from an action in negligence in relation to court work is 
absolute. Although argument may arise as to how the boundaries of ‘conduct 
that is intimately connected with in-court conduct’27 be defined, this is not a 
problem that affects the relationship between the parties significantly.28 It is 
therefore suggested that labelling of the advocate’s ‘no-liability outcome’ at 
the duty stage, as immunity from liability in negligence, is justified and as a 
rule is well understood.29  
 
Other situations of ‘no-duty’30 are not readily categorized as an immunity 
from liability in negligence, because, it is argued, the explanation underlying 
the no-duty outcome is too widely drawn or based on factual determinations 
and terminology, not capable of identification as an immunity.31 An immunity 
suggests a blanket exemption from liability to which the rest of the world is 
subject, rather than a general principle of law based on ‘countervailing 
factors’ which may apply to the factual situation at hand and from which 
exceptions may exist.  
                                                 
24 Ibid 457. 
25 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 214 ALR 92 (‘D’Orta’). 
26 The immunity applies equally to judges, witnesses and prosecutors. 
27 D’Orta (2005) 214 ALR 92, [95]. 
28 The application in D’Orta of the immunity to ‘conduct that is intimately connected 
with in-court conduct’ was left unchanged from the original High Court decision in 
Giannerelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543.  
29 While it may be relatively easy to define it has been argued that the advocates’ 
immunity it is not the most coherent rule. See Peter Cane, ‘Case Note: The new face 
of advocates’ immunity’ [2005] 13 Torts Law Journal 93 where he argues that the 
High Court’s decision in D’Orta, has failed to provide a rationally argued outcome, 
leaving ‘the law in a state of confusion’. 
30 Examples of ‘no-duty’ situations include no general duty to rescue Stovin v Wise 
[1996] AC 923 (HL), no general duty to protect from third party harm Modbury 
(2000) 205 CLR 254.  
31 See Stapleton, above n 21, 303 where she argues that courts have often masked the 
‘normative reasoning’ behind identification of ‘countervailing systemic factors’ in 
‘factual terminology’.  
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In Barrett v London Borough of Enfield,32 Lord-Browne-Wilkinson 
commented 
  
Although the word ‘immunity’ is sometimes incorrectly used, 
a holding that it is not fair, just and reasonable to hold liable a 
particular class of defendants whether generally or in relation  
to a particular type of activity is not to give immunity from a 
liability to which the rest of the world is subject.33 
 
A  Can it be said that the police enjoy immunity 
from liability? 
 
While Australian courts have rejected the United Kingdom’s three-stage 
Caparo34 test that asks, after a determination of foreseeability and proximity, 
whether the imposition of liability in the particular circumstances is fair, just 
and reasonable, the application of policy considerations to the determination 
of duty of care is fundamental in both jurisdictions.35 The Australian approach  
to novel duty of care cases proceeds by way of analogy to apply in an 
incremental fashion, material or salient factors relevant to the particular 
factual situation at hand.36 In Sullivan v Moody37 the High Court referred to 
the various classes of problems that may bear upon the determination of a  
 
 
 
                                                 
32 [1999] 3 All ER 193. 
33 Ibid 197. See also, X and Others v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 211, 
where denial of a duty of care being owed by local authorities to children in its care 
has not led to ‘immunity’ from liability. What the case has done is to provide 
‘countervailing systemic factors’, which have been applied in analogous cases to help 
signal the bounds of the no-liability outcome.  
34 Refers to the three-stage test, employed by the UK courts to determine the existence 
of a duty of care in novel cases. First enunciated in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman 
[1990] 2 AC 605. although pursued for some time by Kirby J, Pyrenees Shire Council 
v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; Perre v Appand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; Crimmins 
v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1990) 200 CLR 1, the test was clearly 
rejected by the High Court in Sullivan v Moody(2001) 207 CLR 562, [49]. 
35 See, eg D A Ipp, ‘Policy and the swing of the negligence pendulum’ (2003) 77 
Australian Law Journal 732, where he discusses the influence of policy on the law of 
negligence; Kylie Burns ‘The way the world is: Social facts in High Court negligence 
cases’ (2004) 12 Torts Law Journal 215. 
36 See, eg, Perre v Appand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; Sullivan v Moody (2001) 
207 CLR 562. 
37(2001) 207 CLR 562. 
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duty.38 Once the problem is identified it ‘will then become the focus of 
attention in judicial evaluation of the factors which tend for or against a 
conclusion to be arrived at as a matter of principle.’39 
 
While application of the material or salient factors may provide a coherent 
body of persuasive factors militating against a duty of care finding in relation 
to particular situations or relationships, such could rarely be described as 
giving rise to immunity from liability in the sense described above. This is 
not to say that the findings do not, at least where explicitly and rationally 
stated, signal to potential plaintiffs the possible limits to liability arising from 
their relationship with the defendant. Despite Justice McHugh’s recent 
comments that immunity is just another name for a conclusion that a 
defendant owes no actionable duty of care in a particular circumstance,40 it is 
argued that to label a particular relationship, even in defined circumstances, 
as giving rise to immunity from liability is misleading. Only in the few 
situations where an absolute outcome of no-liability is present, such as for 
advocates, can the label of immunity from liability be given.  
 
Labelling the relationship between the police and members of the public in 
relation to the suppression and investigation of crime as giving rise to 
immunity from liability for negligence is similarly misleading. Even in the 
United Kingdom, where the protection from liability afforded to police is 
extensive, such forms of labelling have been subject to judicial criticism.41  
 
In Australia, despite support by the courts for the decision in Hill,42 it has 
been acknowledged that there is no absolute immunity for police from 
negligence claims in relation to the investigation and suppression of crime. 
As Atkinson J recently stated ‘[t]here is … no binding authority that police 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 These include the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff, including harm caused by 
the criminal conduct of third parties, the powers and discretion of statutory 
authorities, indeterminacy and conflicts with other duties or legal principles. Sullivan 
v Moody  ibid [50]. 
39 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 [50] footnotes omitted. 
40 D’Orta (2005) 214 ALR 92, [100], [101].  
41 See, eg, Osman v. United Kingdom - 23452/94 [1998] ECHR 101 (28 October 
1998) and Brooks [2005] UKHL 24, [27]. Note also comments by Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill in JD (FC) (appellant) v. East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust (FC) 
[2005] UKHL 23 [25]. 
42 See, eg Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, [56] [57], Tame v New South Wales 
(2002) 211 CLR 540, 562 and the numerous state court decisions referred to below. 
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officers enjoy a blanket immunity from liability in tort in the investigation 
and prevention of crime although they are “generally exempt” from 
liability.’43  
 
Accepting, as is appropriate, that there is no immunity from negligence 
actions for police, any inquiry into the duty owed by police should proceed, 
once foreseeability is established, on the basis that policy considerations may 
be applicable as part of the balancing of salient factors.44 This does not imply 
that for every factual situation the courts must engage in an arduous 
exploration of each of the factors anew. As will be discussed there are policy 
considerations arising from the statutory and common law functions of public 
authorities charged with investigatory functions that have attracted sound 
‘countervailing systemic factors’ in certain circumstances, militating against a 
duty finding. However it is the methodology, adopted in the UK and in some 
Australian courts, which proceeds on the basis that all police investigative 
functions are immune from liability in negligence on public policy grounds, 
and from which exceptions are applied, which is criticised in the following 
section as failing to provide a principled body of law.  
 
 III  THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICE LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE 
 
 A  United Kingdom 
Prior to the decision in Hill, it was acknowledged that, in certain 
circumstances, police conduct may give rise to a duty of care. In Hill, Lord 
Keith referred to cases where a person had been injured as a ‘direct result’ of 
the officer’s positive acts and omissions as examples where liability had been 
held to exist.45 Other examples of liability include negligent driving by police 
in the performance of their duties, and instances where the police conduct also 
gives rise to intentional torts.46 It is suggested that the rationale for these latter  
 
                                                 
43 Peat v Lin [2004] QSC 219, [24] footnotes omitted. 
44 Graham Barclay Oysters Property Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540; Crimmins v 
Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1990) 200 CLR 1; Sullivan v Moody (2001) 
207 CLR 562, [49]. 
45 Hill [1989] AC 53, 55 (Lord Keith). Cases referred to were Knightley v Johns 
[1982] 1 All ER 851; Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 2 All ER 
985.  
46 See, eg, Gaynor v Allen [1959] 2 QB 403, Johnstone v Woolmer (1977) 16 ACTR 
6, Blight v Warman and McAllan [1964] SASR 164 all referred to by Brooking J in 
Zalewski v Turcarolo [1995] 2 VR 562, Victoria v Horvath [2003] VSCA 24. 
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cases can be explained by the undemanding test of foreseeability that is 
applied almost exclusively in cases where physical harm is the direct result of 
the defendant’s conduct.47 
 
Where it is alleged the police were negligent in their investigative functions, 
different and more complex considerations have been held to apply. This issue 
was first addressed in Hill. The case concerned police conduct in the 
investigation of serial murders. The mother of the last victim brought an 
action alleging police negligence in failing to apprehend the accused prior to 
the death of her daughter.48 Lord Keith, concerned with indeterminate 
liability, relied on the absence of ‘a special relationship’ between the victim 
and the police in denying a duty of care.49 In Hill the victim was said to be 
one of a ‘vast number of the female general public who might be at risk from 
his activities but was at no special distinctive risk in relation to them’.50 This 
lack of proximity and absence of a ‘special relationship’ has since been 
applied in a number of cases to deny a duty of care in situations where the 
harm to the plaintiff has been caused by the negligent or criminal conduct of a 
third party.51  
                                                 
47 See M Davies and I Malkin, Butterworths Tutorial Series: Torts, (2003) pp 109, 
116; H Luntz, D Hambly, Torts Cases and Commentary (2002). See also, McHugh in 
D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 214 ALR 92, where at [101] he states 
‘Reasonable foreseeability of physical harm is generally enough to impose a duty of 
care on a person who knows or ought to ought reasonably foresee that physical harm 
is a likely result of his or her conduct’. The police exceptions to this principle that 
McHugh J refers to are not instances of ‘direct’ physical harm caused by the 
defendant police, but indirect harm caused by a failure to control a third party. 
48 For a detailed critique of the investigation in Hill, including the reasons why the 
plaintiff brought the claim, see Joan Smith, Misogynies: Reflections on Myth and 
Malice (1989) 117-151. 
49 Hill [1989] AC 53, 57. The case was distinguished from the earlier decision of 
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] 2 All ER 294 where prison officers were 
held to owe a duty of care to surrounding property owners when they failed to prevent 
the escape of boys in their custody. In Dorset the defendant’s knowledge of the 
detainees propensity to escape and the ‘exceptional’ risk to those whose property was 
in close proximity gave rise to the limited duty of care. (Lord Diplock). 
50 Hill [1989] AC 53, 57 (Lord Keith). 
51 See, eg, Ancell v McDermott [1993] 4 All ER 355; Clough v Bussan [1990] 1 All 
ER 431; Alexandrou v Oxford [1993] 4 All ER 328. These cases involved ‘pure 
omissions’ and may be contrasted with situations where the police took control of the 
situation, provided protection for members of the public and then negligently 
withdrew from the scene. In these cases a sufficient relationship of ‘proximity’ had 
been created and a duty of care arose. See, eg Gibson (AP) v Orr; Chief Constable 
Strathclyde Police [1999] Scot CS 61 and O’Rourke v Schacht (1974) 55 D.L.R (3rd) 
96.  
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To ensure the path was blocked for future plaintiffs,52 Lord Keith enunciated a 
number of public policy grounds supporting a ‘no-duty’ finding.53 Drawing an 
analogy from the barrister’s immunity then in force,54 he held police immune 
from action ‘of this kind’, as to impose a duty ‘may lead to the exercise of a 
function being carried on in a defensive frame of mind.’55 Further he argued 
that the nature of police investigative work required decisions to be made on 
matters of policy and discretion and  
 
[m]any such decisions would not be regarded by the courts as 
appropriate to be called into question … A great deal of police time, 
trouble and expense might be expected to have to be put into the 
preparation of the defence to the action … The result would be a 
significant diversion of police manpower and attention from their 
most important function, that of the suppression of crime.56 
  
It has been argued that the effect of Hill ‘was to recast tort law as the enemy, 
not the instrument, of public policy’.57 
 
 B  Treatment of the Hill decision 
Over the next decade in the UK, Hill was elevated to a ‘doctrine of immunity’ 
for police when performing investigatory functions. Initially interpreted as 
applying primarily to police policy and discretionary decisions, it was 
extended to operational decisions ‘taken in the course of attempts to control 
serious public disorder’.58 Negligence claims made by accused persons 
against prosecuting authorities failed on similar policy grounds, namely that 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 Laura Hoyano ‘Policing Flawed Police Investigations: Unravelling the Blanket’ 
(1999) 62 The Modern Law Review 912. 
53 This was arguably obiter dicta comments of Lord Keith which have become the 
focal point in many cases since. Lord Templeman similarly referred to policy grounds 
as the reason for denying a duty of care was owed. In Hughes [1991] 4 All ER 278, 
May J refers to the policy grounds as obiter dicta, cf Lord Bingham in Brooks [2005] 
UKHL 24, [19], where he refers to this as part of the ratio decidendi of Hill. 
54 Rondel v Worsley [1987] 1 All ER 1173. But note the House of Lords has since 
abolished the immunity Hall v Simon [2000] 3 WLR 543. 
55 Hill [1989] AC 53, 57. 
56 Ibid 59. 
57 Hoyano above n 52, 912. 
58 Hughes [1991] 4 All ER 278. 
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to impose a duty would inhibit the functions and duties of the authority, 
exhausting valuable time and resources.59 
 
In 1998, the European Court of Human Rights held that the Court of Appeal’s 
approach to police negligence actions in the case of Osman v Ferguson60 
‘proceeded on the basis that the [immunity] rule provided a watertight defence 
to the police and that it was impossible to prise open an immunity which the 
police enjoy from civil suit in respect of their acts and omissions in the 
investigation and suppression of crime’.61 The ECHR held that this breached 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, by denying the 
plaintiffs the opportunity to have their matter heard on the facts before a 
tribunal.62 The ECHR’s decision brought criticism from domestic courts and 
commentators, and recent findings by the ECHR have tempered the original 
findings.63  
 
Post Osman, courts in the UK have been generally cautious to ensure that the 
Hill policy considerations have been dealt with within the framework of the 
three-stage Caparo test.64 Within this framework the courts have 
acknowledged that the stages are not distinct and often overlap, so that in the  
 
 
 
                                                 
59 See, eg, Elguzouli-Daf v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis[1995] QB 335; 
Mesigna v Commissioner Australian Federal Police[2001] ACTSC 46; Cran v New 
South Wales [2004] NSWCA 92. 
60 [1993] 4 All E.R. 344. 
61Osman v. United Kingdom - 23452/94 [1998] ECHR 101. In Osman v Ferguson the 
claimant was the victim of third party criminal conduct and he claimed that despite 
clear warnings and requests for assistance from the police, the police had negligently 
failed to protect him and his father. cf Van Colle v Hertfordshire Police [2006] 
EWHC 360 (QB). 
62 The relevant part of the European Convention on Human Rights provides (Article 
6.1) ‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations….everyone is entitled to a 
hearing by [a]…tribunal’. 
For discussion of the ECHR’s findings in Osman v United Kingdom see Rt Hon Lord 
Hoffman ‘Human Rights and the House of Lords’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 
159; L Hoyano above n 52; T. Wier ‘Down Hill all the Way?’ (1999) 58 Cambridge 
Law Journal 4. 
63 Z v United Kingdom (application no. 2939/95) the ECHR noted that the use of the 
third stage of the Caparo test, alleviate earlier concerns in Osman of the operation of 
a blanket immunity for police, [99]. 
64 See, eg, Brooks [2005] UKHL 24; Cowan v The Chief Constable for the Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary [2001] EWCA Civ 1699. 
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rare ‘exceptional cases’ where a ‘special relationship’ exists - generally as a 
result of an assumption of responsibility65 - policy considerations may be 
outweighed.  
 
There have, however, been few exceptions found on this basis. In a case 
where a senior police officer failed to assist a junior officer who was assaulted 
by a person in custody, a duty of care was held to exist based upon the degree 
of responsibility assumed by the defendant for the plaintiff’s safety.66 
Similarly a duty was held to exist where the negligent failure of police to keep 
the identity of an informer confidential resulted in threats of violence and 
consequent psychiatric harm to the plaintiff.67 In strike-out proceedings, the 
court held that it was arguable that proximity was satisfied as the police had 
assumed responsibility for the anonymity of the particular plaintiff, thereby 
creating a ‘special relationship’ justifying the imposition of a duty. The court 
held that competing public policy considerations particular to police informers 
regarding confidentiality and anonymity outweighed the Hill policy 
arguments.68 What will amount to an ‘assumption of responsibility’ sufficient 
to warrant this exception to the core Hill principle is unclear.69  
 
Despite some commentators suggesting that the ECHR’s findings in Osman 
caused ‘a wholescale retreat from public policy immunity’70 it is arguable that  
 
                                                 
65 See, eg, Brooks [2005] UKHL 24, [29], The Chief Constable of Northumbria v 
Costello [1998] EWCA Civ 1898, Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria [1996] 
3 All ER 449 (‘Swinney’). 
66 The Chief Constable of Northumbria v Costello [1998] EWCA Civ 1898. . Cf 
however Hughes [1991] 4 All ER 278, where despite the employment situation, no 
duty was held to exist for an operational decision made by a senior officer in relation 
to a serious public disorder. 
67 Swinney [1996] 3 All ER 449. Another exception was found in the case of Kirkham 
v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [1992] WLR 987 where the 
police were held to owe a duty to advise the prison authority of the plaintiff’s suicidal 
tendencies.  
68 Swinney [1996] 3 All ER 449. In this case the court treated the public policy 
grounds as a possible defence to the claim which was considered after a duty was 
found to exist. 
69 Cf Hughes [1991] 4 All ER 278, no assumption of responsibility. But also cf Van 
Colle v Hertfordshire Police [2006] EWHC 360 (QB). 
70 Rosalind English ‘Forensic Immunity Post-Osman’ (2001) 64 Modern Law Review 
300 at 306, where she refers to a number of cases since Osman where the House of 
Lords have demonstrated ‘a wholescale retreat from public policy immunity’. None of 
the cases however, were concerned with allegations of police negligence in the 
investigation or suppression of crime but with duties owed by other public authorities. 
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the most recent pronouncements by the House of Lords demonstrate a return 
to the broad exclusionary rule enunciated in Hill. While the Lords, in 
Brooks,71 were willing to concede that there may be exceptional cases where 
exceptions to Hill were justified,72 and that the principle in Hill should be 
‘reformulated in terms of the absence of a duty of care rather than a blanket 
immunity’,73 the court was not willing to depart from the core sentiments and 
findings in Hill.  
 
In Brooks the plaintiff alleged police negligence in the treatment of him as a 
victim and witness of a serious crime. Despite the clear evidence of gross 
negligence74 the court held: 
 
A retreat from the principle in Hill would have detrimental 
effects for law enforcement. Whilst focusing on 
investigating crime, and the arrest of suspects, police 
officers would in practice be required to ensure that in 
every contact with a potential witness or a potential victim 
time and resources were deployed to avoid the risk of 
causing harm or offence. Such legal duties would tend to 
inhibit a robust approach in assessing a person as a possible 
suspect, witness or victim. By placing general duties of 
care on the police to victims and witnesses the police’s 
ability to perform their public functions in the interests of 
the community, fearlessly and with despatch, would be 
impeded. It would, as was recognised in Hill, be bound to 
lead to an unduly defensive approach in combating crime.75 
 
Similar to the general approach in UK cases, Brooks proceeded before the 
House of Lords on the basis that the Hill principles applied. An exception 
sought by the applicant, namely that a duty arises where the harm is caused 
by the direct positive acts or omissions of police, as distinct from the indirect 
harm caused to the victim in Hill, was dismissed by the court. 
 
 
 
                                                 
71 Brooks [2005] UKHL 24. 
72 Ibid, [6] (Lord Nicholls). 
73 Ibid [27] (Lord Steyn). 
74 Matter had been dealt with by public enquiry (The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: 
Report of an Inquiry by Sir William MacPherson of Cluny (1999) Cm 4261-I), so that 
issues of fact were not in dispute. 
75 Brooks [2005] UKHL 24, [30]. 
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The United Kingdom cases demonstrate the difficulties plaintiffs encounter in 
attempting to avoid the broad exclusionary or ‘immunity’ rule that is applied 
in actions alleging police negligence in the investigation of crime. Arguments 
raised by plaintiffs to justify exceptions to the rule based on 
operational/policy decisions,76 direct and indirect harm,77 operational and 
investigative functions,78 and detection of crime and prevention of crime,79 
have generally failed, with the result that the rule has been applied to an ever 
increasing variety of police activity.  
 
 C  Other Jurisdictions 
Unlike the UK, Canadian courts have utilised the tort of negligence to 
scrutinise police investigatory activity. Originating with Doe,80 the courts 
have declined to follow Hill, and by doing so ‘do not appear to have triggered 
an avalanche of cases’.81 The court found that in the peculiar circumstances of 
Doe, the police owed a duty to warn the plaintiff of the dangers she 
encountered as a member of a particular class of women, vulnerable to attack 
by a serial rapist. The police, it was held, were aware of the risk posed and as 
such the requirements of foreseeability and proximity of relationship were 
satisfied. Policy arguments although argued by the defence, were not applied 
to deny the duty.82 
 
In South Africa and New Zealand courts have also found public policy 
grounds denying a duty of care unconvincing.83 The Constitutional Court of 
South Africa has noted that the requirements of foreseeability and proximity 
provide sufficient grounds for limiting liability and provide a sufficient 
balance to the fears that imposition of a duty may adversely affect the proper 
exercise of police officers’ duties. As the court has noted ‘[l]iability … must 
… be determined on the basis of the law and its application to the facts of the  
 
 
                                                 
76 Hughes [1991] 4 All ER 278. 
77 Brooks [2005] UKHL 24. 
78 Hughes [1991] 4 All ER 278.  
79 Alexandrou v Oxford [1993] 4 All ER 328. 
80 Doe (1998) 160 D.L.R. (4th) 697. 
81 Hoyano, above n 52, 930. 
82 See Melanie Randell, ‘Sex Discrimination, Accountability of Public Authorities 
and the Public/Private Divide in Tort Law: An analysis of Doe v. Metropolitan 
(Municipality) Commissioners of Police’ (2001) 26 Queen’s Law Journal 451. 
83 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (2001) 12 BHRC 60; Whithair v 
Attorney General (1996) 2 NZLR 45. 
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case, and not because of an immunity against such claims granted to the 
respondents.’84  
 
However, similar to the UK, United States courts have been loathe to impose 
a duty of care on the basis that to do so interferes with resource decisions 
which are the realm of the executive.85 This ‘fundamental principle that a 
government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public 
services, such as police protection, to any particular individual citizen’,86 has 
supported the public duty doctrine which provides a broad exemption for 
police from negligence actions. The courts have however recognised that 
‘[q]uite distinguishable, of course, is the situation where the police authorities 
undertake responsibilities to particular members of the public and expose 
them, without adequate protection, to the risks which then materialize into 
actual losses.’87 Therefore where there is an assumption by the police of an 
affirmative undertaking to act on behalf of the injured party and the injured 
party justifiably relies on that undertaking, a duty will arise and public policy 
considerations (similar to Hill) will have no bearing on the issue.88 
 
 D  The Australian Position 
 
 1  High Court 
 
The High Court has not been required to consider the scope of the duty of care 
owed by police to individual members of the public; however, broad support 
is evident for the Hill public policy grounds in a number of judgments. In 
Sullivan v Moody89 where the High Court was examining the duty of care  
owed by defendants charged with investigation of child sexual abuse to those  
 
                                                 
84 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (2001) 12 BHRC 60, [49]. 
85 Riss v City of New York 2 N.Y. 2d 578; 240 N.E. 2d 897.  
86 Warren v District of Columbia 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1981). 
87 Riss v City of New York. York 2 N.Y. 2d 578; 240 N.E. 2d 897. See also Warren v 
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Id, Anthony Mastroianni v County of 
Suffolk et al., 91 N.Y. 2d 198, Cuffy v City of New York 69 N.Y. 2d 222, Sorichetti v 
City of New York, 65 N.Y. 2d 579. Note however De Wald v State, 719 P.2d 643 
(Wyo. 1986), Adams v State 555 P. 2d 235 (Alaska, 1976) where the public duty 
doctrine has been rejected. 
88 See Anthony Mastroianni v County of Suffolk et al., 91 N.Y. 2d 198. While 
assumption of an undertaking and justifiable reliance are the main elements required 
to establish a ‘special relationship’, the courts also require knowledge on part of 
police that harm could result from failure to act and direct contact between the police 
and the injured party. 
89 (2001) 207 CLR 562. 
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under investigation the court stated:  
 
How may a duty of the kind for which the appellants contend 
rationally be related to functions, powers and responsibilities 
of the various persons and authorities who are alleged to owe 
that duty? A similar problem has arisen in other cases. The 
response to the problem in those cases, although not 
determinative, is instructive. 
In Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, the House of 
Lords held that police officers did not owe a duty to 
individual members of the public who might suffer injury 
through their careless failure to apprehend a dangerous 
criminal. Lord Keith of Kinkell pointed out that the conduct 
of police investigation involves a variety of decisions as to 
priorities in the deployment of resources. To subject those 
decisions to a common law duty of care, and to the kind of 
judicial scrutiny involved in an action in tort, was 
inappropriate.90 
 
In Tame v New South Wales, referring to Hill, Gummow and Kirby JJ 
commented: 
 
It is unlikely that an investigating police officer owes a 
duty of care to a person whose conduct is under 
investigation. Such a duty would appear to be 
inconsistent with the police officer’s duty ultimately 
based in the statutory framework and anterior common 
law by which the relevant police service is established 
and maintained, fully to investigate the conduct in 
question. 91 
 
Similarly Hayne J stated 
 
Police officers investigating possible contravention of the 
law do not owe a common law duty to take reasonable 
care to prevent psychiatric injury to those whose conduct 
they are investigating. Their duties lie elsewhere and to 
find a duty of care to those whom they are investigating 
would conflict with those other duties.92  
                                                 
90 Ibid [56],[57]. 
91 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 540, [231]. 
92 Ibid [292]. 
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McHugh J has been equally supportive of the Hill principles, though again 
commenting that a person subject to a ‘special risk of harm’ may fall outside 
the no-duty rule.93 Consistent with these comments, a variety of State cases 
have held that inconsistent obligations owed to the person under investigation 
and potential victims operate to deny a duty of care owed by the investigating 
body to the person under investigation.94  
 
In addition to the public policy grounds stated above, where the harm is 
caused by the criminal acts of a third party, the plaintiff will be required to 
overcome ‘the general rule … that one man is under no duty of controlling 
another man to prevent his doing damage to a third’.95 When one considers 
the High Court’s treatment of this principle in Modbury,96 and analogous 
recent state decisions,97 it is suggested that this will not be an easy task. 
Gleeson CJ acknowledged that exceptions may arise where ‘the criminal 
conduct is attended by such a high degree of foreseeability, and predictability, 
that it is possible to argue that the case would be taken out of the general 
principle and the law may impose a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent 
it.’98 Other relevant factors to consider in determining the applicability of  
 
                                                 
93 D’Orta (2005) 214 ALR 92 [101] and [102]. 
94 See, eg, where the investigating body is the police or prosecution authorities 
Heponstall v Gaskin [2003] NSWSC 693; Cran v New South Wales [2004] NSWCA 
92; Courtney v Tasmania [2000] TASSC 83; Ward v Dickson & Chief Constable 
[1999] NIQB 8; Elguzouli-Daf v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1995] QB 
335; New South Wales v Paige [2002] NSWCA 235; Wilson v New South Wales 
[2001] NSWSC 869; where the investigatory body is responsible for child welfare, SB 
v New South Wales [2004] VSC 514;, JD (FC) v East Berkshire Community Health 
NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 23; Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, where the 
investigatory body is the Equal Opportunity Commission, Smith v South Australia 
[2002] SASC 355 (Supreme Court of South Australia, Full Court, Unreported 
Judgment).  
95 Smith v Luers (1945) 70 CLR 256 (Dixon J). This principle itself comes from the 
original concept that unless there is a ‘special relationship’ warranting an exception to 
the rule, a person is generally not liable for mere omissions; there is in general no 
duty to rescue, Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 (HL) 943-44. 
96 Modbury (2000) 205 CLR 254.  
97 See, eg, X v South Australia [2005] SASC 150 where the South Australian Supreme 
Court held the Parole Board did not owe a duty of care to a young plaintiff who was 
injured by a notorious paedophile who was under their supervision. The case was 
distinguished from the earlier case of Swan v South Australia (1994) 62 SASR 532. 
98 Modbury (2000) 205 CLR 254, 267 (Gleeson CJ)(Gaudron J whilst agreeing with 
Gleeson CJ added ‘[t]here are situations in which there is a duty of care to warn or 
take other positive steps to protect another against harm from third parties. Usually a 
duty of care of that kind arises because of special vulnerability, on the one hand, and 
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imposing a duty will include the defendant’s ability to control the harm, the 
plaintiff’s vulnerability and assumption of responsibility by the defendant.99  
 
 2  State Court Decisions 
 
Recent state and federal court decisions have confirmed the difficulties 
plaintiffs will face in establishing that a duty of care is owed by police 
officers to individual members of the public in their investigative functions. 
The courts differing methodologies demonstrate that, in Australia, the 
approach to this question is far from clear and consistent.  
 
The following list outlines the circumstances in which the courts have held 
that no duty of care is owed by police: 
 
1. Where off-duty police officers attending a nightclub witnessed a 
patron of the club being abusive and violent and failed to act to 
restrain him prior to his vicious assault on the plaintiff.100 This 
was based upon concerns of indeterminate liability, inconsistent 
obligations with the public at large and ‘impermissible 
interference in the operational decisions of police’.101 The court 
acknowledged the strength and support for the Hill public policy 
considerations, and applied these within the six questions 
proposed by McHugh J, as applicable to novel duty of care cases 
concerning statutory authorities.102 
2. Where police officers alerted an absconding parent that they were 
aware of her whereabouts, allowing her the opportunity to 
remove the children from the plaintiff.103 The case proceeded on 
the conceded assumption that Hill provided ‘immunity’ to police 
in the conduct of investigations, the argument turned on whether 
the conduct in question amounted to an investigation. The court 
also refused an argument that the immunity should not apply as  
 
                                                                                                                    
on the other, special knowledge, the assumption of a responsibility or a combination 
of both.’, 270). 
99 See, eg Cran v New South Wales [2004] NSWCA 92; State of New South Wales v 
Godfrey [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-741; Modbury (2000) 205 CLR 254, 270 
(Gaudron J); Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 
39; Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540. 
100 Peat v Lin [2004] QSC 219. 
101 Ibid [29]. 
102 Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1990) 200 CLR 1, [93]. 
103Quintano v New South Wales [2002] NSWSC 278.  
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there were no conflicting obligations placed upon the police. The 
court held conflicting obligations owed to the plaintiff and the 
absconding parent existed.104 
3. Where the plaintiff’s detention in custody was prolonged due to 
the failure of police to complete a form requesting prompt 
analysis of evidence.105 The case proceeded on the basis that 
‘immunity’ for police existed in relation to their investigative 
functions and held that subjecting even ministerial tasks to a duty 
of care would affect police resources. Thus no exception was 
warranted.106 Assumption of responsibility was acknowledged as 
a recognised exception, not applicable to the prosecuting 
authority in this case due to the existence of advocate’s 
immunity.107 
4. Where the plaintiff as a person under investigation claimed 
negligence by the police in their investigation and/or prosecution 
of alleged criminal activity.108 These cases have proceeded upon 
the basis that the inconsistent obligations and duties owed by 
police to the public and those owed to the individual under 
investigation militate against a duty of care. However it is 
interesting to note that once the investigation is complete a duty 
has been held to exist to advise the convicted person of 
information that the conviction may have been unsafe.109 
5. Where the plaintiff claimed psychiatric harm due to failure of the 
prosecuting authorities to prosecute a person alleged to have 
assaulted the plaintiff.110 This was based upon the inhibiting 
effect the duty would place upon the discretionary function of 
prosecutors.  
6. Where the plaintiffs claimed psychiatric harm as a result of police 
negligence in identifying their deceased mothers after a traffic  
 
 
                                                 
104 Ibid [41]. 
105 Cran v New South Wales [2004] NSWCA 92. 
106 Ibid [50], [51]. 
107 Ibid [52].  
108 Wilson v New South Wales [2001] NSWC 869, Heponstall v Brian Gaskin [2003] 
NSWSC 693, Gibbs v Qld [2000] QCA 33, Courtney v Tasmania [2000] TASSC 83.  
109 Tache v Abboud [2002] VSC 36, where concerns about promoting defensive 
investigatory conduct, were held not to be relevant once a conviction is reached. 
Rather to impose a duty after this time, was held to enhance due performance. 
110 Mesinga v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police [2001] ACTSC 46, 
Grimwade v Victoria (1997) 90 A Crim R 526. 
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accident, the result being that each of the deceased was identified 
as the other.111 The court held that the detrimental effect of 
imposing a duty on police investigatory functions applied equally 
to traffic accident investigations.112  
7. Where the plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s negligent use of 
information provided to the police by his father, exposed him to 
the risk of the death penalty.113 This was based upon the purpose 
and function of the police to investigate the matter and the 
conflicting obligations imposition of a duty would place upon the 
officers.114 Interestingly, Finn J referring to the differing 
approaches of the courts in Australia to the question of the 
existence and scope of police duty of care, commented that: ‘[I]t 
is, in my view, unnecessary in this matter to express a concluded 
view on whether, as in England, a special, though not 
unqualified, immunity rule applies to police activities “in the 
investigation and suppression of crime” ... or whether the duty of 
care question is to be answered by applying to police those 
principles now generally applied to public authorities in the 
discharge of their statutory and, if relevant, common law 
functions’.115 Preference was expressed for the latter approach.  
 
A small number of these cases analysed the Hill policy considerations within 
the duty of care framework adopted by the High Court in dealing with public 
authorities.116 This framework begins with a determination of foreseeability 
of harm, followed by consideration of salient factors which include 
examination of the authority’s statutory obligations, the defendant’s power to 
protect the plaintiff (control), the vulnerability of the plaintiff,117 the 
defendant’s knowledge of the risk of harm, and policy considerations 
 
 
 
                                                 
111 Halech v South Australia [2006] SASC 29. (Unreported judgments). 
112 Ibid [59]. 
113 Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12 (Unreported judgments). 
114 Ibid [117]. 
115 Ibid [101]. 
116 A number of cases have adopted the six-stage approach propounded by McHugh J 
in Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 39 [93]. 
See, eg, Peat v Lin [2004] QSC 219; Wilson v New South Wales [2001] NSWC 869. 
117 Vulnerability is referred to by McHugh in Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry 
Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, [93] ‘in the sense that the plaintiff could not 
reasonably be expected to adequately safeguard himself or herself or those interests 
from harm’. 
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including inconsistent obligations. Within this analysis is the recognition that  
resource allocations and ‘quasi-legislative’ decision making are not 
justiciable.118  
 
Conversely there are a number of cases where the courts, in effect, adopt the 
UK approach of applying as a first step an immunity rule to police activity in 
the investigation and suppression of crime. Under this analysis it is accepted 
that the ‘immunity rule’ is not absolute, however the cases demonstrate ‘the 
difficulty in providing criteria to mark out exceptions to [the] immunity’.119 In 
the UK this has resulted in awkward and sometimes incoherent arguments 
concerning policy/operational distinctions,120 direct and indirect harm,121 and 
the effect of imposing a duty on discretionary decision making. Rather than 
clarify the law, these cases have only served to further blur the lines between 
duty and no duty. 
 
In the rare cases where a duty has been held to exist, the courts, while 
acknowledging that blanket immunity does not exist for police in Australia, 
have attempted to identify exceptions to the Hill principles to justify the 
imposition of a duty of care. In the Victorian case of Zalewski v Turcarola,122 
where the plaintiff was shot and injured by the police, the court considered 
the defendant’s argument that they were immune from liability on the public 
policy grounds enunciated in Hill. In distinguishing Hill and Osman, the court 
applied an exception to the ‘immunity rule’ enunciated by May J in Hughes v 
National Union of Mineworkers.123 In Hughes, May J had argued that a duty 
would attach to incidents involving ‘specifically identified antecedent 
negligence’ but not ‘operational decisions taken in the course of attempts to 
control serious public disorder’.124 In Zalewski, Hansen J concluded that as 
the case involved ‘specifically identified antecedent negligence’ in which the  
 
 
 
                                                 
118 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, [14] (Gleeson CJ). 
119 Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12, [101], (Finn J), referring to The 
Chief Constable of Northumbria v Costello [1998] EWCA Civ 1898, Cowan v The 
Chief Constable for Avon & Somerset Constabulary [2001] EWCA Civ 1699. 
120 A distinction that has been acknowledged is often difficult to draw, see eg Graham 
Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, [12] (Gleeson CJ). 
121 This distinction was referred to as unhelpful in Brooks [2005] UKHL 24, [32] 
(Lord Steyn). 
122 [1995] 2 VR 562 (‘Zalewski’). 
123 [1991] 4 All ER 278. 
124 Ibid 288. This is how May J distinguished his decision from Rigby v Chief 
Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 2 All ER 985.  
2006 Police Liability for Negligent Investigations  
 
55 
 
police officer ‘did not act in accordance with his training and instructions’, 
the application of any form of ‘immunity’ did not exist.125 This latter 
exception was said to be justified by the English decisions in Rigby126 and 
Knightley.127 
 
One of the difficulties with this approach is defining what is meant by 
‘specifically identified antecedent negligence’. Could it not equally be argued 
that the ‘litany of derelictions’ of police duty identified in Brooks also 
amounted to acts of ‘specifically identified antecedent negligence’? Or the 
failure by the police in Cran to complete the request for analysis of the 
suspected drugs, in accordance with their procedures? These too were clear 
examples of where the police officers ‘did not act in accordance with ... 
training and instructions’. Is the distinction not more appropriately defined as 
the difference between direct and indirect harm, a distinction identified as 
unhelpful by Lord Steyn in Brooks?128 Arguably as Zalweski involved direct 
physical harm to the plaintiff, similar to negligent police driving, the complex 
policy issues concerning third party harm, competing and inconsistent 
obligations, and encouraging defensive practices did not arise.129 This then 
begs the question, should this conduct not be classified as police investigatory 
work as originally envisaged in Hill, so that questions of ‘immunity’ do not 
arise? In other cases where parties have suffered direct physical injury as a 
result of bungled police raids and use of excessive force, no ‘immunity’ 
defence has been raised, despite claims based on negligence as well as 
intentional torts. Why this is so is not entirely clear.130 Little attempt has been 
made by the courts to adequately define what amounts to police conduct in 
the ‘investigation and suppression of crime’.131  
 
In attempting to rationalise the distinctions between Zalweski and those 
authorities applying the Hill policy considerations, Hidden J, in the New 
South Wales Supreme Court, recently stated: 
 
 
 
                                                 
125 [1995] 2 VR 562, 567. 
126 Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 2 All ER 985. 
127 Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 All ER 851.  
128 Brooks [2005] UKHL 24, [32] (Lord Steyn). 
129 Equally an action in battery could have been initiated. 
130 See, eg, Victoria v Horvath [2003] VSCA 24 and in particular the comments by 
Hayne J in Horvath v Victoria [2004] HCA Trans 215, where he questions whether a 
duty of care was applicable to the case. 
131 See, eg, Quintano v New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 278.  
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What may set Zalewski and the present case [also concerned with a 
police shooting of a mentally disturbed man] apart from the other 
authorities is that the police were not engaged in an investigation in 
the ordinary sense. Rather, their task was to prevent a possible 
breach of the peace and to restrain a mentally disturbed person 
from harming himself and others. Whether that is a relevant 
distinction is not immediately apparent.132 
 
A case that squarely raised the complex issues of liability for third party 
criminal harm and Hill public policy considerations was the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Tasmania in Batchelor v The State of Tasmania.133 Blow J 
refused to strike out the plaintiff’s statement of claim, which alleged police 
negligence in failing to protect the plaintiff’s mother from the fatal shooting 
by his father. Prior to the shooting the mother had sought assistance from the 
police for assaults and threats made to her by the father. While at the police 
station, the father entered and was told that he would be served with a 
restraining order. In apparent disregard of the ‘pro-charge pro-arrest’ policy 
then in force, the police did not arrest the father for the purpose of issuing a 
restraining order, but instead advised him they were taking the mother to the 
matrimonial residence to collect her belongings and confiscate his firearms. 
After leaving the police station, the father travelled to the home where he took 
one of the firearms and lay in wait. Despite noticing the firearm was missing, 
the police did not evacuate the property, and the father carried out his threats 
by shooting the mother and then himself.  
 
Relying on the possible exceptions to the general ‘no-duty’ rule for harm 
caused by third parties, referred to by Gleeson CJ in Modbury,134 Blow J held 
that the situation carried a high degree of ‘foreseeability’. Further as the 
police had assumed responsibility for the safety of the mother, who was 
clearly vulnerable135 (at least in the short term while collecting her 
belongings), had taken control of the situation and had the ability to control 
the father (again at least in the short term) it was arguable that a duty may 
arise. It is suggested that in these circumstances the decision is clearly 
justified. 
 
                                                 
132 Klein v New South Wales [2005] NSWSC 1341 (Unreported Judgments), emphasis 
mine. 
133 [2005] TASSC 11 (‘Batchelor’).  
134 Modbury (2000) 205 CLR 254, [30], [34]. 
135 Vulnerability in this sense refers to her relationship with the defendants. She was 
dependent on their ability to protect her and vulnerable to their response to her 
situation. 
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Blow J’s treatment of the defendants’ argument that they were immune from 
a duty of care on policy grounds is less convincing. Acknowledging ‘that it 
remains to be seen’ whether Australian courts would follow the authority 
establishing a ‘doctrine of immunity’ in the UK, Blow J interpreted the 
English authorities as proposing that the immunity ‘as held in Hill … is not 
available to a police officer who has acted otherwise than in accordance with 
his or her training and instructions.’136 Relying primarily on the judgment in 
Zalewski, Blow J held that as it was arguable the police had failed to act in 
accordance with their training by not following the pro-arrest pro-charge 
policy, the ‘immunity’ did not apply.  
 
For the same reasons as stated above, this distinction is unhelpful. Many 
instances of police negligence will arise out of a failure to act in accordance 
with training and instructions and yet, under UK authority, no duty has been 
held to exist. A preferable approach, it is submitted, would have been to 
analyse the application and appropriateness of the various policy grounds 
within the duty of care framework applicable to public authorities to 
determine if they warranted a finding of ‘no-duty’. The issues of assumption 
of responsibility,137 control and vulnerability in this case, would have 
operated to negate concerns of inconsistent obligations and effectively limited 
indeterminacy. It is suggested that Blow J’s approach, despite acknowledging 
there is no blanket immunity for police negligent conduct, incorrectly begins 
from the premise that ‘immunity’ in some form exists, from which exceptions 
must be found.  
 
IV  WHERE TO FROM HERE? 
 
Australian appellate courts are poised to define precisely how to apply the 
Hill public policy considerations. The proliferation of recent novel cases in 
this area and the diversity of judicial approaches confirm that a coherent body 
of law providing clear and authoritative guidelines is yet to be established. As 
has been demonstrated in part three, the UK approach of applying a qualified 
‘doctrine of immunity’ from which exceptions are argued has led to differing 
and sometimes inconsistent justifications. This approach, it is argued, should 
be avoided. 
                                                 
136 Batchelor [2005] TASSC 11, 24, relying on Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 All ER 
851; Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 2 All ER 985and Zawelski 
[1995] 2 VR 562. 
137 As stated above, assumption of responsibility for a particular plaintiff’s safety, as 
opposed to the public at large, has been recognised in the UK and US jurisdictions as 
warranting an exception to the ‘immunity’ rule. 
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The opportunity also exists for Australian courts to reassess a number of the 
policy principles in light of recent decisions and findings in other 
jurisdictions. Lord Keith’s decision in Hill was influenced, at least in part, by 
the barrister’s immunity then in force. This ‘immunity’ was justified by a 
concern that to impose a duty of care would lead to defensive practices 
detrimentally affecting police activities. This argument must now be of 
doubtful validity given decisions in the United Kingdom and Australia 
regarding barrister’s immunity.138 
 
Although research has suggested that police do hold genuine fears of 
litigation,139 other research has argued the impact of fear on police 
performance and willingness to act has been exaggerated.140 In relation to 
advocate’s immunity, the majority in D’Orta acknowledged that although 
arguments that imposition of liability would lead to defensive practices were 
not irrelevant, they were also ‘not of determinative significance.’141  
 
Of greater significance is the compelling argument that the fear of litigation 
promotes better policing practices.142 As has been noted, ‘nothing more 
effectively focuses the mind and hence improves the quality of decisions by a 
police officer than the knowledge that the decision may be subject to scrutiny  
 
 
 
                                                 
138 In the UK the public policy grounds relied on in Hill as applied to barristers has 
since been abolished in Hall v Simon [2000] 3 WLR 543. In D’Orta, the majority has 
dismissed a number of the original policy grounds said to justify the immunity. See 
also the view that this was not applicable to teachers in Phelps v Hillingdon London 
Borough Council [2000] 4 All ER 504. 
139 S. Jellerr, N.K. Pope and K.E. Voges ‘The Stress of Litigation’ (1994) Australian 
Police Journal 163; Forrest Scogin, Stanley Brodsky ‘Fear of Litigation Among Law 
Enforcement officers’, (1991) X (1) American Journal of Police 41. 
140 See, eg, Civil litigation by citizens against the Australian Police between 1994 and 
2002, Report to the Criminology Research Council, by Dr Jude McCulloch and Mr 
Darren Palmer. CRC Grant No 19/01-02, Current Commentary, Australasian Centre 
for Policing Research, No 5 Nov 2002 [1] – 11, www.acpr.gov.au/pdf/ACPR_ cc5.pdf 
accessed 6.3.06; Tony Zalewski, ‘Litigation in Law Enforcement’, Security Oz; 
Number 15; February/March 2002; 076-081; David Brereton, ‘Monitoring Integrity’ 
in Tim Prenzler and Janet Ransley (eds), Police Reform Building Integrity (2002) 99, 
113. 
141 D’Orta (2005) 214 ALR 92, [29]. 
142 See eg, Tom Hughes, ‘Police officers and civil liability: “the ties that bind”?’ 
(2001) 24 Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management’ 
240, 245; McCulloch and Palmer above n 140.  
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by a court of law.’143 Lord Keith’s argument that ‘the general sense of public 
duty which motivates police forces is unlikely to be appreciably reinforced by 
imposition of such liability’ was premised on the basis that police always 
apply their best endeavours to their public duty, a sentiment, which as the 
court acknowledged in Brooks, is no longer universally accepted. Police 
corruption and misconduct are still of major concern in Australian police 
forces and public dissatisfaction with police complaints mechanisms has been 
seen as a contributing factor to the increase in civil litigation against police 
and a driving force for demands for greater transparency and 
accountability.144  
 
Concerns of encouraging defensive practices, once raised in an attempt to 
limit medical negligence claims, have long since been rejected. There is no 
suggestion that law enforcement, in jurisdictions where Hill public policy 
grounds have not been imposed to deny a duty, has been detrimentally 
affected in this way.  
 
Underlying these arguments is the assumption that negligence actions against 
the police are relatively easy to initiate and that rejection of such policy 
considerations will ‘open the floodgates’.145 On current authority this is 
clearly not the case. Concerns of indeterminate liability can be addressed 
within the framework of the High Court’s ‘astute use of the vulnerability 
concept’,146 which will require proof that the plaintiff is at a distinctive risk, 
as opposed to the general public, and the defendant has the ability to control 
the source of harm or has assumed responsibility for the plaintiff’s safety. The 
limits thus placed on duty of care will effectively counter arguments that 
valuable police resources will be diverted from policing activities to defend 
unmeritorious claims.147 
 
 
 
                                                 
143 Marcus Tregilgas-Davey’s ‘Osman v Metropoitan Police Commissioner: The Cost 
of Police Protectionism’ (1993) 56 (5) The Modern Law Review 732, 735.  
144 See eg,. McCulloch above n 140, 10. 
145 Melanie Randell, ‘Sex Discrimination, Accountability of Public Authorities and 
the Public/Private Divide in Tort Law: An analysis of Doe v. Metropolitan 
(Municipality) Commissioners of Police’ (2001) 26 Queen’s Law Journal 451, 487. 
146 Jane Stapleton ‘The golden thread at the heart of tort law; protection of the 
vulnerable’, (2003) 24 Australian Bar Review 135, 139. 
147 Note a similar argument was rejected by the House of Lords in relation to 
education authorities and the duties owed to their pupils in meeting their special 
educational needs in Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2000] 4 All ER 
504. 
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Police investigatory work by its nature involves a great deal of discretionary 
decision making. Concern that many such decisions ‘would not be regarded 
by the courts as appropriate to be called in question’148 can be adequately 
dealt with by consideration of the statutory and common law functions of the 
public authority. Where an authority charged with investigatory functions 
owes inconsistent obligations to the particular plaintiff and the general public, 
the balancing of competing obligations will favour the public and no duty of 
care to the particular plaintiff will be owed. Where the plaintiff is a person 
under investigation it is accepted that imposition of a duty of care would in 
many circumstances involve inconsistent obligation, a ‘countervailing factor’ 
that will be difficult to surpass on current authority.149 Furthermore due to the 
competing demands on police it could be argued that ‘the standard of care 
that … courts would require before they found that a duty of care had been 
breached would be high and would … act as one (of many) controlling 
devices against an open-ended liability’.150 Balancing of competing factors at 
the breach stage and difficulties associated with causation, particularly when 
concerned with third party criminal harm, would effectively limit liability in 
many cases. 
 
High level policy decisions and resource issues would not, on current 
authority, be justiciable.151 Although distinguishing between policy and 
operational decisions is often difficult and is not universally favoured by the 
High Court,152 such considerations would still provide limits on duties to be 
imposed. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
148 Hill [1989] AC 53, 55 (Lord Keith). 
149 For an opposing view that is certainly not without merit, that these issues are better 
dealt with as a question of breach, see Elizabeth Handlsey ‘Sullivan v Moody: 
Foreseeability of injury is not enough to found a duty of care in negligence – but 
should it be?’ (2003) 11 Torts Law Journal 1. 
150 Basil Markesinis, ‘Plaintiff’s tort law or defendant’s tort law? Is the House of 
Lords moving towards a synthesis?’ (2001) 9(2) Torts Law Journal 168, referring to 
the duty owed by education authorities to children in relation to their special 
educational needs. 
151 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, [14] (Gleeson CJ).  
152 Ibid. 
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 A  Civil Liability Legislation 
Further safeguards for police authorities have been included within the Civil 
Liability Acts153 provisions which provide ‘principles’ to be applied in 
determining ‘whether a public or other authority has a duty of care or has 
breached a duty of care.’154 The provisions confirm that the general allocation 
of resources is not justiciable and that the functions required to be exercised 
must be considered in light of budgetary and resource constraints and by 
reference to ‘the broad range of its activities’.155 This is consistent with the 
current common law approach. 
 
Under the provisions an authority will be able to rely on compliance of its 
‘general procedures and applicable standards … as evidence of the proper 
exercise of its functions.’156 In NSW and Qld further protection is afforded to 
authorities in that they will not be liable for the wrongful exercise of, or 
failure to exercise, a statutory function ‘unless the act or omission was in the 
circumstances so unreasonable that no public or other authority having the 
functions of the authority in question could properly consider the act or 
omission to be a reasonable exercise of its functions.’157 The effect of these 
provisions will provide the police with a defence to all but the most 
unreasonable exercises of their duties. 
 
V  CONCLUSION 
 
This article has sought to explain the extent of police liability for negligent 
conduct in Australia. It has confirmed that while in Australia police do not 
enjoy blanket immunity from liability there is strong support for the broad 
‘no-duty’ approach adopted in the United Kingdom. It has urged caution in 
applying the extent of the policy grounds first enunciated in Hill, and 
suggested that the current approach of the High Court to the duty owed by 
public authorities charged with investigative functions provides sufficient  
 
                                                 
153 In all jurisdictions other than Northern Territory and South Australia similar 
provisions regarding the duty and scope of public authorities have been enacted. See 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 40; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s110; Civil 
Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s35; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 38; Wrongs Act 1958 
(Vic) s83, Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s5W. 
154 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s35. 
155 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s35.  
156 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s35. 
157 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s36 (2), Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 43A. 
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safeguards to indeterminate liability. Policy considerations that are particular 
only to police officers, such as the fear of defensive practices, need to be 
carefully reassessed.  
 
It is suggested that policy factors operating to deny a duty of care owed by 
police officers must be clearly articulated and justified to avoid unwarranted 
elevation to a broad exclusionary rule. Where a broad ‘no-duty’ rule is 
applied, difficulties arise in attempts to justify exceptions, often on 
inconsistent and spurious grounds. This it is argued is contrary to ‘the 
development of a principled, general law of negligence’.158 
 
Recent Australian state court decisions dealing with police negligence have 
attempted to reconcile the various approaches to the Hill principle adopted in 
the UK, often becoming entangled in complex argument about the type of 
police conduct involved. Such distinctions have only served to blur the lines 
between duty and no-duty, providing little guidance to potential plaintiffs and 
police departments concerned to minimise risk. While the search for a single 
unified duty of care formula may be unattainable, principles applicable to 
public authorities have, it is argued, developed sufficiently to provide a 
consistent approach to police negligence actions.  
 
For this area to develop in a principled way, it is suggested that once 
foreseeability is established, exploration of the policy considerations 
applicable to public authorities charged with investigative functions must be 
clearly articulated and care taken to ensure that issues of control, vulnerability 
and assumption of responsibility are adequately considered. Courts should 
avoid reference to ‘police immunity’ as it masks the fact that there are 
circumstances where judicial scrutiny of police conduct is warranted. In an 
age of increasing police investigatory powers caution must be exercised to 
ensure that civil rights infringements are balanced against the pursuit of 
alleged criminal activity. 
 
                                                 
158 Joachim Dietrich ‘Duty of care under the ‘Civil Liability Acts’ (2005) 13(1) Torts 
Law Journal 17, 22. 
